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John Turner
12 Myths about 
Individual Accounts for 
Social Security Reform
This article highlights research from John 
Turner’s new book, Individual Accounts 
for Social Security Reform—International 
Perspectives on the U.S. Debate, which was 
published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 for 
details.
The recent federal budget proposal 
provides hundreds of billions of dollars 
to establish individual accounts as part 
of Social Security reform. The budget 
includes funding necessary to establish 
voluntary carve-out accounts, which are 
accounts that would partially replace 
Social Security. Workers who choose 
these accounts would receive reduced 
Social Security benefits, and in exchange 
would have part of their retirement 
income based on the investment 
performance of the account. The United 
Kingdom is the only high-income country 
that uses these accounts, but the number 
of British workers participating in them 
has declined by about 20 percent since 
its peak in 1993, despite growth in the 
labor force. The Pensions Commission, 
a national commission in the United 
Kingdom assigned to propose major 
reforms, has recommended abolishing 
those accounts.
This article examines 12 myths about 
individual accounts and how they would 
work if they were an option for Social 
Security participants. These myths persist 
because they contain elements of truth, 
though usually in a different context. For 
example, some myths about voluntary 
carve-out accounts are true statements 
for mandatory add-on accounts that 
would be provided in addition to 
Social Security. Some myths are true in 
idealized situations but not in the actual 
implementation of individual accounts. 
Some contain elements of truth that are 
outweighed by other considerations in a 
more complete analysis. 
 
Myth 1. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
are similar to 401(k) plans or the Thrift 
Savings Plan for federal government 
workers.
All three are individual accounts, and 
some lessons can be learned from the 
experience with 401(k) plans and the 
Thrift Savings Plan. However, in this 
context the salient feature of 401(k) plans 
and the Thrift Savings Plan is that both 
are add-on account plans. They do not 
reduce workers’ Social Security benefits, 
as would occur for voluntary carve-out 
accounts. In addition, the Thrift Savings 
Plan’s reported administrative cost, often 
considered a benchmark, considerably 
understates the cost of a Social Security 
program of individual accounts because 
the government subsidizes the Thrift 
Savings Plan’s administrative costs.
Myth 2. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
would foster an ownership society.
Workers own outright their 401(k) 
plan accounts. However, with a voluntary 
carve-out account, while workers own the 
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balance in the account, the money used 
to fund the account is a loan that workers 
must pay back with interest through a cut 
in their future Social Security benefits. 
Thus, voluntary carve-out accounts could 
be characterized as fostering a debt 
society.
Myth 3. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
would increase national savings.
Whether add-on accounts increase 
national savings is controversial (Orszag 
and Stiglitz 2001). However, voluntary 
carve-out accounts are much less likely to 
do so. The worker finances them through 
the implicit borrowing from the Social 
Security program. Also, the government 
would likely borrow for at least part of 
the transition costs of paying current 
retirees’ benefits. 
Myth 4. Workers would only choose 
a voluntary carve-out account if that 
choice made them better off.
Well-informed workers making 
rational decisions who voluntarily 
choose an option are made better off. 
However, in the United Kingdom, many 
workers who have chosen voluntary 
carve-out accounts have been made 
worse off because they were wrongfully 
influenced in the “misselling” scandal. 
The magnitude of their errors is immense. 
These workers have been reimbursed $26 
billion by financial service providers in 
an economy a sixth as large as United 
States.’ 
Myth 5. A worker’s survivors would 
be better off if the worker chose a 
voluntary carve-out account.
Survivors could inherit the balance of 
the individual account if the account has 
not been annuitized. However, the worker 
with a voluntary carve-out account would 
give up some of the survivors insurance 
that Social Security provides. If that 
worker dies at a young age, the account 
balance would be small, and the survivors 
would generally be better off with the 
full survivor benefits that Social Security 
provides.
Myth 6. Individual accounts would be 
free from political risk.
Individual accounts, in principle, can 
be managed so that they are free from 
political risk. However, international 
experience has shown that because they 
are created by legislators in a political 
environment, they frequently are subject 
to political risk. For example, in Sweden, 
the default fund, which most new 
participants invest in, does not invest 
in Coca Cola because of the Swedish 
government’s objections to some of Coca 
Cola’s policies. 
Myth 7. Individual accounts would 
reduce government involvement in the 
retirement income system. 
The government would probably 
provide a reduced percentage of 
retirement income if there were Social 
Security individual accounts. However, 
the Social Security Administration’s 
bureaucracy could easily double due 
to the recordkeeping requirements for 
voluntary carve-out accounts (Hart et al. 
2001). The government would also have 
an expanded role through its regulatory 
oversight of individual accounts.
Myth 8. Low-income workers would be 
better off with individual accounts.
Low-income workers tend to not 
own stock; thus, having an individual 
account could diversify their sources of 
retirement income. However, workers 
with low income are poorly situated to 
bear stock market risk because of their 
limited ability to absorb downside risk. 
Also, the rate of return that low-income 
workers receive from Social Security 
tends to be higher than for higher-income 
workers because of the progressivity of 
Social Security’s benefit formula. The 
taxation of the Social Security benefits 
of higher earners further reduces their 
rate of return from Social Security. Thus, 
high-income workers have more to gain 
from individual accounts that substitute 
for Social Security than do low-income 
workers. In addition, the level of financial 
literacy among low-income workers tends 
to be low, so they would be more prone 
to costly investment errors. Relatively 
few low-income workers in the United 
Kingdom participate in the voluntary 
carve-out individual accounts.
Myth 9. Workers would be good 
financial managers of their individual 
accounts.
Some workers would be good 
financial managers. However, experience 
with 401(k) plans and the mandatory 
individual accounts in Sweden indicates 
that many workers make errors in 
choosing their investments and in the 
timing of changes in their investments. 
Some workers follow trends, buying 
high and selling low. Many workers who 
are financially vulnerable have a low 
level of financial literacy, and lack of 
financial literacy appears to be a cause 
of workers making investment errors. 
Demographic literacy is also important. 
Surveys have found that many workers 
underestimate their life expectancy, and 
do not understand the probability of 
living longer than their life expectancy, 
which would cause them to plan for a 
shorter retirement period than they likely 
will experience.
Myth 10. The rate of return workers 
receive from individual accounts would 
be higher than what they receive from 
Social Security.
Stocks on average earn a higher 
gross rate of return than the implicit 
rate of return workers receive on 
their contributions to Social Security. 
However, if appropriate adjustments are 
made, on average the two rates of return 
would be equivalent (Brown, Hassett, 
and Smetters 2005). Those adjustments 
include taking into account the higher 
risk in stocks, the higher administrative 
costs of individual accounts, the value 
of the various forms of insurance 
Social Security provides, the cost of 
annuitization of account balances, and 
the higher taxes ultimately needed to pay 
transition costs to an individual account 
system. The comparison also assumes 
that workers do not make serious errors 
in financial management.
Myth 11. Individual accounts would 
not redistribute income.
Individual accounts can be disbursed 
as lump sum benefits, which do not 
redistribute income. However, when 
they are annuitized, they perversely 
(regressively) redistribute income from 
low- to high-wage workers who tend 
to have longer life expectancy and thus 
receive benefits for more years. If lower-
income workers receive lower rates of 
return than higher-income workers, that 
would also cause an adverse change in 
the distribution of retirement income.
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Earnings Losses 
for Injured Workers 
Myth 12. Individual accounts would 
not affect labor supply and retirement 
age because they closely link 
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between 
contributions and the amount invested in 
an individual account. Also, individual 
accounts would not be financed by an 
explicit tax, which would distort labor 
supply. However, the volatility in stock 
and bond markets causes there to be 
a weak link between contributions 
and benefits. Further, a mandatory 
contribution, whatever its link to 
benefits, can be an implicit tax because 
it is mandatory. If the mandatory 
contributions act like an implicit tax, that 
would discourage workers from working 
and encourage them to retire. The low 
participation rates of workers in Latin 
American mandatory accounts may 
result from such an effect on their labor 
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in 
equity markets can cause workers with 
individual accounts to delay retirement, 
with that effect occurring at a time when 
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor 
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in 
Washington, D.C.
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Since publishing Adequacy of 
Earnings Replacement in Workers’ 
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt 
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have 
continued to analyze the important 
policy issues discussed in the report. The 
National Academy of Social Insurance 
(NASI) study panel that produced the 
report found that earnings replacement 
for permanent partial disabilities 
in five states ranged from 29 to 46 
percent—a rate far short of the 67 percent 
replacement rate specified by statute 
in these state workers’ compensation 
systems. Thus, the analysis raised 
concerns about the adequacy of workers’ 
compensation earnings replacement 
benefits.
However, there were some problems 
with these findings. First, employer 
representatives on the study panel 
objected to using the two-thirds 
earnings replacement standard for 
permanent partial disability (PPD) 
cases. They asserted that because 
such cases are frequently disputed 
and their compensation may be the 
result of compromise settlements, it 
is inappropriate to expect such claims 
to achieve the two-thirds standard. 
Therefore, the study panel believed 
it would be beneficial to assess the 
adequacy of temporary total disability 
benefits. 
In addition, there were analytical 
issues that affected the results, even 
though the same assumptions had been 
used for studying the five states. Because 
the analysis focused on aggregate wage 
losses and aggregate compensation 
payments, it implicitly weighted the 
more serious claims more heavily. The 
longer the wage loss continues, the more 
times the injured worker is counted in 
the aggregate wage losses. But is the 
policy question, what proportion of all 
the wages lost by injured workers is 
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all 
injured workers received adequate wage 
replacement? The earlier studies answer 
the first question, but not the second. 
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question, 
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the 
State of Oregon for administrative data 
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity 
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon’s 
workers’ compensation system. Our 
empirical work uses a dataset composed 
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured 
in 1992 or 1993. They all received 
temporary disability payments of at 
least three days, or PPD compensation. 
We exclude workers with disabilities 
lasting less than three days, and those 
with missing values for certain key 
variables. We also exclude workers aged 
51 and older at the time of injury in 
order to reduce the effect of voluntary 
early retirement on postinjury wage loss 
calculations. 
We have unemployment insurance 
data, which consist of quarterly wage 
records for all Oregon workers from the 
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth 
quarter of 1998. We were able to match 
98.8 percent of injured workers to their 
administrative wage records (based on a 
unique but anonymous identifier provided 
for each worker). The resulting dataset 
combines claims-related data such as date 
and type of injury, compensation benefits, 
length of absence from work, and 
demographic variables, with the pre- and 
The NASI study panel’s 
analysis raised concerns about 
the adequacy of workers’ 
compensation earnings 
replacement benefits.
